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THE NEW-AGE STREETS AND PARKS: GOVERNMENT-RUN
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AS TRADITIONAL
PUBLIC FORUMS
ABSTRACT
In 1939, the Supreme Court held in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization that citizen speech in government-owned properties such as streets
and parks is subject to heightened First Amendment protection. These
properties, the Court reasoned, are by their very nature reserved for the public
to use for assembly and communication. Over time, these properties were
labeled “public forums,” and the Supreme Court divided them into a number of
categories, each affording varying levels of protection to private speech. The
“streets and parks” from Hague were classified as “traditional public forums,”
and received the strongest level of constitutional protection.
While the public forum doctrine has evolved over time to reflect the new
technologies and realities of today’s world, courts have resisted expanding the
traditional public forum beyond its origins largely due to language in Hague,
which suggested that a traditional public forum must be “immemorially . . . held
in trust for the use of the public.” This has led to public venues that are critical
for assembly and communication in today’s world, such as government-run
social media accounts, being classified as “limited’ or “designated public
forums,” which offer fewer protections for citizens’ speech. This is an
inconsistent standard that has permitted government officials to restrict and
censor their constituents’ speech from their official social media pages,
sometimes with impunity.
This Comment argues that government-run social media accounts, arguably
the most vital government-run venue for assembly and communication today,
should be classified as traditional public forums. These accounts encompass
nearly all of the historical qualities of the traditional public forum, apart from
the “immemorial” standard from Hague. Careful review of public forum
jurisprudence throughout the last century, however, shows that the
“immemorial” standard should be treated not as a concrete requirement, but as
merely one of many factors that weigh in the public forum equation.
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INTRODUCTION
The political fate of the United States in 2020 was decided, in no small part,
by social media. As the COVID-19 pandemic limited in-person activity,
candidates were forced to take to the internet to reach potential voters.1 U.S.
President Joe Biden, tasked with defeating the “digital behemoth” run by
incumbent Donald Trump,2 hired a firm to connect him with social media
“influencers” on Instagram to target younger demographics.3 U.S.
Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ilhan Omar supported the Biden
campaign by arranging a voter outreach event on Twitter—not an in-person
meeting, but a livestream of the video game Among Us on online broadcasting
platform Twitch.4 The event drew over 400,000 concurrent viewers, who
watched as Ocasio-Cortez simultaneously discussed healthcare in the United
States and conducted detective work in space.5 In the two decisive Senate races
in Georgia, both winning candidates relied heavily on social media: before his
runoff election against incumbent David Perdue, thirty-three-year-old Jon
Ossoff began regularly posting videos on TikTok,6 a social networking platform
with over 60% of its U.S. userbase between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four.7
Fellow Georgia Senator Raphael Warnock used his Twitter account to post ads
and pictures of him with a supporter’s pet dog, which were lauded for attempting
to neutralize the use of racial stereotypes against him.8
1
Peter Suciu, Social Media Proved Crucial for Joe Biden – It Allowed Him to Connect with Young
Voters and Avoid His Infamous Gaffes, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/
11/17/social-media-proved-crucial-for-joe-biden—it-allowed-him-to-connect-with-young-voters-and-avoidhis-infamous-gaffes/?sh=175ac36e4148.
2
Eric Bradner & Dan Merica, Biden’s Campaign Rushes to Blunt Trump’s Digital Advantage, CNN
(May 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/09/politics/joe-biden-digital-campaign/index.html.
3
Rebecca Heilwell, Inside the Biden Campaign’s Surprising Influencer Strategy, VOX (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/recode/21429755/influencers-joe-biden-democrats-pacs-social-media-facebookinstagram-campaign.
4
Allegra Frank, AOC Met More Than 400,000 Young Potential Voters on Their Own Turf: Twitch, VOX
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/10/22/21526625/aoc-twitch-stream-among-us-most-populartwitch-streams-ever.
5
Id.
6
Christopher Alston, Ossoff Uses TikTok to Court Young Voters Crucial to Democrats’ Success, WABE
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.wabe.org/ossoff-uses-tiktok-to-court-young-voters-crucial-to-democrats-success.
7
Greg Roumeliotis, Yingzhi Yang, Echo Wang & Alexandra Alper, Exclusive: U.S. Opens National
Security Investigation into TikTok – Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sourcesidUSKBN1XB4IL.
8
Michael Tesler, Raphael Warnock’s Dog Ads Cut Against White Voters’ Stereotypes of Black People,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 15, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/raphael-warnocks-dog-ads-cut-againstwhite-voters-stereotypes-of-black-people/; Shane Goldmacher, How Alvin the Beagle Helped Usher in a
Democratic Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/us/politics/raphaelwarnock-puppy.html.
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Elsewhere, U.S. constituents and voters leaned just as heavily on the same
platforms. Social media granted users unprecedented access to their elected
officials, which they used to “tag” then-President Donald Trump on Twitter at a
rate of 1,000 times per minute, collectively.9 It allowed them to instantaneously
reach huge number of fellow users; in particular, social media emerged as a
crucial tool in publicizing and exposing police violence against Black
individuals.10 It caught the attention of the Supreme Court, who called social
media a “principal source[] for knowing current events, . . . speaking and
listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms
of human thought and knowledge.”11 By any standard, social media is an
unprecedented tool for the purposes of speech, assembly, and petition,12 rights
explicitly protected by the First Amendment.13
It is surprising, then, that private speech on government-run social media
accounts is not afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection.14
When Trump was sued in 2017 for blocking several users for expressing
viewpoints contrary to his,15 the Second Circuit held that, while Trump’s
censorship of private speech was unconstitutional, it was unconstitutional only
because of his reasons for blocking the users.16 Had Trump blocked speech from
his account arbitrarily, with no regard as to which speakers or speech were being
censored, there is no guarantee that the court would have found his actions
unconstitutional. This decision contrasted sharply with the constitutional
protections afforded to public venues like streets and parks, in which the
Supreme Court has held that the government can only restrict speech if the
restriction is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly

9
Mike McIntire, Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, In Trump’s Twitter Feed: Conspiracy-Mongers,
Racists and Spies, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/
trump-twitter-disinformation.html.
10
Meredith D. Clark, Dorothy Bland & Jo Ann Livingston, Lessons from #McKinney: Social Media and
the Interactive Construction of Police Brutality, 6 J. SOC. MEDIA IN SOC’Y 284, 285–86 (2017).
11
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
12
See id. at 1736. (“While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution
of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think,
express ourselves, and define who we want to be.”).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14
See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump (Trump II), 928 F.3d 226, 239 (2d Cir.
2019).
15
Blocking a user on Twitter prevents them from viewing, following, or messaging the blocking user’s
account. See Meira Gebel, How to Block or Unblock Someone on Twitter on a Computer or Mobile Device, BUS.
INSIDER (July 23, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-unblock-someone-on-twitter.
16
Trump II, 928 F.3d at 239–40.
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drawn to achieve that end.”17 Arbitrary censorship of speech in a public park,
for instance, would undoubtedly be held unconstitutional.
This dilemma is not unique to Trump. Across the United States, government
officials are attracting attention and lawsuits for allegedly infringing on their
constituents’ First Amendment rights by blocking or censoring them on official
government-run social media pages.18 Not a single one of these cases has
afforded social media the same level of protection afforded to public venues like
streets and parks.19 The reason for this disparity is the public forum doctrine,
birthed by the Supreme Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization in 193920 and developed into a concrete framework in Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n in 1982.21 The public forum
doctrine is split into three categories, each offering varying levels of protection
against government censorship of speech: (1) the traditional public forum,
(2) the limited or designated public forum, and (3) the nonpublic forum.22
Streets and parks, immortalized by Hague as “immemorially . . . held in trust for
the use of the public,” are classified as traditional public forums and receive the
highest level of First Amendment protection.23 Government-run social media
accounts, in the few instances that they have been classified by courts, have been
labeled limited or designated public forums, relegated to a lesser level of
protection purely due to their modern origins.24 This “immemorial” standard,
drawn from Hague, has served as a judicially enforced bar to traditional public
forum status for government-run social media accounts, even in light of social
media’s importance to the exercise of First Amendment rights.25 This is both
practically troubling, given that the Supreme Court has referred to social media
as the “modern public square,”26 and legally ambiguous, as inspection of public
forum jurisprudence suggests that the “immemorial” standard is less critical to
the formation of a traditional public forum than many courts have held. This
17

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citation omitted).
See Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-cv-00296-JAW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146894, at *42–43 (D. Me.
Aug. 29, 2018); Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666,
687 (4th Cir. 2019).
19
See Leuthy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146894, at *42; Robinson, 921 F.3d at 448; Randall, 912 F.3d at
687.
20
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
21
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
22
Id.
23
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
24
See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump (Trump I), 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 575
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[W]e conclude that the interactive space of a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account
constitutes a designated public forum.”).
25
See id. at 573–74.
26
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
18
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Comment argues that in light of the history and purpose of the public forum
doctrine, the “immemorial” standard should not be viewed as a concrete
requirement, and thus government-run social media accounts should be
classified as traditional public forums.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I first explores the origins and
development of the public forum doctrine by examining the Supreme Court’s
public forum jurisprudence from 1939 to 1982, with an eye to how the Court’s
definition of the public forum expanded from merely “streets and parks” to
countless other government properties. It next identifies five “core qualities” of
these newly classified public forums: (1) they were among society’s most
important places for the exercise of free speech; (2) they provided civilian access
to government officials through the First Amendment rights of assembly and
petition; (3) they were, in the absence of speech protections, at risk of arbitrary
exercise of government power; (4) they could host speech without causing
significant disruption; and (5) they had “immemorially” been used for the
purposes of speech and assembly. Lastly, it shows how these qualities were both
absorbed and rejected by the monumental Perry framework, which dramatically
changed the contours of the public forum doctrine by creating three strict
categories, each receiving a different level of government protection.27
Part II examines how courts have utilized the relatively modern Perry
framework in the technological age. Particularly, it examines how they have
applied the public forum doctrine to government-run social media accounts, and
the factors they have considered in assigning these accounts to Perry’s second
category.
Part III shows that the proper classification for government-run social media
accounts is the first Perry category: the traditional public forum. First, it
examines the implications of classifying a venue as a traditional public forum
rather than a limited or designated public forum, and why these implications are
particularly important in regard to government-run social media accounts. Next,
it shows that government-run social media accounts encompass four of the five
“core qualities” of the traditional public forum better than Hague’s streets and
parks. Lastly, it shows why the fifth core quality—the “immemorial” standard—
should not be a concrete requirement to the formation of a traditional public
forum, and thus should not be a bar to government-run social media accounts
being classified as such.

27

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
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Finally, Part IV addresses modern day questions and trends regarding the
expansion of the traditional public forum to include government-run social
media accounts. It begins by examining concerns about the convergence of the
public forum doctrine and government-run social media accounts and concludes
by examining the support for reorganization of the traditional public forum and
the public forum doctrine as a whole.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

The legal concept of the public forum—and, by extension, the traditional
public forum—traces its roots back to 1939, when the Supreme Court decided
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.28 Decades earlier, the Court
had suggested that the government’s ability to impose restrictions on speech in
government-owned areas was largely unfettered,29 but in Hague, it opted for a
more flexible approach.30 In his plurality opinion, Justice Owen Roberts wrote
that an ordinance that forbade citizens to “distribute . . . [in] any street or public
place any newspapers, paper, periodical, books, magazine, circular, card or
pamphlet” without a permit violated the First Amendment.31 In words that would
become critical to the Court’s development of the public forum doctrine, Justice
Roberts stressed that streets and parks were explicitly established by the
government for the use of the people, writing that “[w]herever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”32
Key to Justice Roberts’s concept of streets and parks as a bastion for free speech
was (1) their typical use for assembly and communication, but also, critically,
(2) the fact that they had been designated for such uses since their creation.33
Hague served as both a confirmation that the government did not have free rein
to suppress speech in government-owned areas, and a suggestion that in some of
these areas, speech was afforded particularly heightened protection from

28

Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).
See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to
forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the
public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”).
30
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).
31
Id. at 501, 516.
32
Id. at 515.
33
Id.
29
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government interference.34 Depending on the speech at issue and the area in
which it was spoken, that level of protection could fluctuate.35
The Court began to apply Hague as an informal balancing test, weighing the
government’s interest in a public venue against citizens’ constitutional right to
free speech in that same venue.36 The Court’s analysis in Schneider v. State in
1939 exemplified this newfound approach.37 Faced with several ordinances
forbidding the distribution of pamphlets in public streets,38 the Court held that
the individuals’ First Amendment rights to free speech outweighed the
government’s interest in the cleanliness of its streets, and thus that the ordinance
was unconstitutional.39 Notably, it echoed Hague by holding that the
individuals’ First Amendment rights were bolstered by the fact that the speech
occurred on public streets.40 The Court noted, however, that even though the
individuals’ free speech interests became stronger in Hague’s “streets and
parks,” they were not absolute—a stronger government interest than mere
cleanliness may have been sufficient to justify the ordinance.41
The theory advanced in Hague and Schneider was twofold: (1) some
government-owned properties implicate strong levels of First Amendment
interests in free speech, and thus, (2) speech in these particular properties
receives heightened protection from government restrictions and censorship.42
These properties were formally labeled “public forums” by then-University of
Chicago law professor Harry Kalven, Jr. in his famous article The Concept of
the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana.43 The Supreme Court eventually adopted
Kalven’s language, and in the coming decades applied the balancing test honed
in Schneider to a number of different potential “public forums.”44 Though the
Schneider balance was far from a bright-line rule, it served as a guide for the
34

Id.
Id. at 515–16. Justice Roberts made clear that this protection was not absolute, writing that “[t]he
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order. . . .” Id.
This idea of balancing the individual and state interests would be vital to subsequent Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
36
See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161, 165.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 153–54.
39
Id. at 165.
40
Id. at 160.
41
Id. at 165.
42
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion); Schneider, 308
U.S. at 161, 165.
43
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12.
44
See infra Part I.B.
35
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Court over the next forty-three years as it expanded the scope of the public forum
doctrine by weighing the government’s interest in potential new forums against
the individual interests in speech within those forums.45 This Part proceeds first
by examining five common qualities of the new public forums anointed under
the Schneider balance by the Supreme Court from 1939 to 1982. It then discusses
the landmark Perry decision in 1982 and how it forever changed the contours of
the public forum doctrine, emphasizing some of these common qualities and
deemphasizing others.
A. The Five Core Qualities of the Public Forum (1939–1982)
Having confirmed that Hague’s streets and parks qualified as public forums
that offer heightened constitutional protection, the Court began to utilize the
Schneider balance to expand the public forum doctrine to similar public
venues.46 While the level of interest in free speech varied from forum to forum,
the forums that received the lofty Hague levels of protection generally shared
five qualities: (1) they were among society’s most important places for the
exercise of free speech; (2) they provided civilian access to government officials
through the First Amendment rights of assembly and petition; (3) they were, in
the absence of speech protections, at risk of arbitrary exercise of government
power; (4) they could host speech without causing significant disruption; and
(5) they had “immemorially” been used for the purposes of speech and
assembly. This section refers to these five points as the “five core qualities” of
the public forum and addresses each of them in turn.
1. Society’s Most Important Places for the Exercise of Free Speech
Protecting speech in society’s most important places for the exercise of free
speech is the crux of the public forum doctrine birthed in the Supreme Court’s
Hague opinion in 1939. In his Hague opinion, Justice Roberts framed the ability
to go to streets and parks as a quintessential American privilege, writing that
citizens of the United States have a “privilege . . . to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions . . . [that] must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied.”47 The idea that free speech in America
reaches its zenith in streets and parks was reflected in other Supreme Court
decisions in the following years.48 In Schneider, the Court held that “the streets
45
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 552–53 (1975).
46
See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116–17; Conrad, 420 U.S. at 552–53.
47
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16 (plurality opinion).
48
See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).

SMITH_3.8.21

964

3/9/2021 11:01 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:955

are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion.”49 In 1943, Justice Black wrote in Jamison v. Texas that “one who is
rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with
him . . . the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.”50
When devising the term “public forum,” Harry Kalven, Jr. noted that streets and
parks “are an important facility for public discussion and political process.”51
In the years to come, the Court would apply the “public forum” tag to all
types of government properties, but the highest level of constitutional protection
was only afforded to forums that shared the same speech-facilitating qualities as
streets and parks.52 Government venues that failed to clear this preliminary
hurdle include prisons,53 letter boxes used by the U.S. Postal Service,54 and
advertising space on buses.55 The Court explicitly used this threshold in Greer
v. Spock in 1976 to reject the idea of a government military reservation receiving
Hague-level protection, writing that “[t]he notion that federal military
reservations . . . have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and
communication of thoughts by private citizens is . . . historically and
constitutionally false.”56 Even in modern jurisprudence, where the Schneider
balancing test has largely been abandoned in favor of a strict classification
approach,57 this still serves as a threshold question: if a public venue is not
critical to the exercise of the free speech, then speech within such a venue
undoubtedly will not receive the highest level of constitutional protection.58
2. Cost-Free Access to Government Officials Through Assembly and
Petition
In the 1960s, the Court regularly used the public forum doctrine as a tool to
combat unconstitutional government practices during the civil rights
movement.59 As citizens took to public spaces to protest, state laws that
49

Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.
Jamison, 318 U.S. at 416.
51
Kalven, supra note 43, at 11–12.
52
Examples of such forums included sidewalks, public libraries, and public theaters. See Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91, 95 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality
opinion); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552–53 (1975).
53
See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966).
54
See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981).
55
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1974).
56
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
57
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
58
See Greer, 424 U.S. at 838 (1976).
59
See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
382 U.S. 87, 91, 95 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion).
50
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prohibited demonstrations and picketing came under fire from plaintiffs who
believed these laws violated their First Amendment rights.60 The Court often
called upon the principles of Hague and Schneider to find such laws
unconstitutional—not only as violations of the First Amendment right to free
speech, but also as violations of the rights to assembly and petition.61 This, in
turn, led to the expansion of the public forum doctrine from “streets and parks”
to other public venues that facilitated the exercise of these freedoms.62
Sidewalks were among the most logical extensions of the public forum
doctrine. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham in 1965, the Court held that
application of a city ordinance that prohibited citizens from standing on a
sidewalk “as to obstruct free passage” was a violation of the citizens’ First
Amendment rights.63 An important factor in the Court’s balance of the state’s
interests against the citizens’ interests was the fact that the ordinance restricted
not only speech, but also assembly.64 The Court noted that the ordinance
essentially provided that “a person may stand on a public sidewalk in
Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city.”65 A sidewalk,
an easily accessible and oft-used public venue, naturally facilitates citizens’
rights to assemble “for communication of views on national questions.”66 Thus,
the government’s attempt in Shuttlesworth to regulate such an area on a mere
“whim” could not overcome the high level of individual interest in speech and
assembly.67
Venues that protected the right to petition were equally important. A year
later in Brown v. Louisiana, the Court used the Hague and Schneider analysis to
hold that arresting members of a sit-in at a segregated public library violated the
members’ First Amendment right “to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”68 In another civil rights case, Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court
held that police arrests of peaceful protestors on public grounds outside the
South Carolina State House were unconstitutional, noting that the protestors

60

See supra note 59.
See id.
62
See id.
63
Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 91, 95.
64
See id. at 90–91.
65
Id. at 90.
66
Id. at 152; see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983) (describing public sidewalks as “among
those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and
are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be
public forum property”).
67
Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90.
68
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966) (plurality opinion).
61
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were exercising their “basic constitutional rights” to petition “in their most
pristine and classic form.”69 The precise location of the forum was not
dispositive to the public forum analysis; the First Amendment rights fostered by
the forum were more important.70 This shift from Hague’s streets and parks
further demonstrated the public forum doctrine moving beyond its traditional
roots, particularly when the venue at issue allowed for the exercise of the First
Amendment rights of assembly and petition to “redress grievances” with the
government.71
Modern cases have added another factor to this equation: when a forum
allows citizens to “redress grievances” with government officials, the citizens’
interest in speech is further strengthened when the forum provides cost-free
access to those officials.72 This draws on the rationale underlying Hague’s
streets and parks: public forums have, since their creation, served as a way for
any citizen, regardless of affluence or status, to interact with and air grievances
to their government officials.73 In United States v. American Library Ass’n in
2002, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that citizen speech on the
internet in a public library might be entitled to Hague levels of protection,
because “[t]he only direct cost to library patrons who wish to receive
information, whether via the Internet or the library’s print collection, is the time
spent reading.”74 A public venue that allows citizens to assemble and petition to
access their government officials is likely to be classified as some sort of public
forum—and if such access is cost-free, then the venue may receive the highest
level of First Amendment protection.
3. A Need to Curb Arbitrary Exercise of Government Power
As the Schneider balancing test considered both individual and state interests
in a public venue,75 factors that weakened the government interest were equally
important to the classification of new public forums. In Kunz v. New York in

69

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 237–38 (1963).
See id. at 235–36 (comparing the protest in Edwards to other protests on public grounds that were more
disruptive, and thus implicated a greater government interest); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727
(1990) (holding that “[t]he mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis”).
71
See supra note 59.
72
See Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 466–67 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
73
Brown, 383 U.S. at 146–47 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “constitutional protection for conduct
in a public building” derives from “the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, petition and
assembly”); Am. Libr., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (suggesting that public libraries are like traditional public forums
because they “do not charge members of the public each time they use the forum”).
74
Am. Libr., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
75
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 165 (1939).
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1951, the Court identified a critical factor in determining the strength of the
government interest: the existence of standards, or lack thereof, for a
government official to consider when deciding whether to issue a permit or
otherwise authorize speech.76 The ordinance at issue in Kunz—used to deny a
permit to a religious preacher to “hold public worship meetings” on the streets—
provided no such standards or guidelines, which was fatal.77 The Court held that
the ordinance violated the First Amendment and “condemned licensing systems
which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit
upon broad criteria.”78
The Court drew upon this logic in Shuttlesworth when it extended public
forum protection to sidewalks.79 The ordinance in Shuttlesworth, which
prohibited citizens from “obstruct[ing] free passage” on sidewalks,80 granted the
state unchecked “moment-to-moment” power.81 Allowing the state to exercise
such power at the expense of its citizens had “ever-present potential for
arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties” and “[bore] the hallmark of a
police state.”82 It was difficult for the government to enforce such loose
restrictions on sidewalks, a natural place for assembly and speech, without doing
so arbitrarily and indiscriminately.83 Thus, citizens’ speech on sidewalks was
subject to additional First Amendment protection.
4. Limited Disruption
While the individual interests in the Schneider balancing test could be
strengthened in venues that (1) were particularly conducive to the exercise of
citizens’ speech84 and (2) allowed for access to government officials through
assembly and petition,85 they could be weakened if the speech caused disruption
in the venue.86 In Grayned v. City of Rockford in 1972, protestors gathered on a
public sidewalk next to a school and were accused of making “noise that was
audible in the school,” distracting “hundreds of students . . . from their school

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293–95 (1951).
Id. at 290, 295.
Id. at 294 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90–91 (1965).
Id. at 90.
Id. (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part)).
Id. at 91 (citations omitted).
See id. at 90–91.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.A.2.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
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activities” and disrupting “orderly school procedure.”87 Though speech on
sidewalks was protected under the public forum doctrine per Shuttlesworth,88
the Court pivoted from its earlier line of cases and held that the city ordinance
under which the protestors were arrested did not violate the Constitution.89 Even
though the speech occurred within a public forum, it could still be censored
because it “materially disrupt[ed] classwork” and “involve[d] substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”90 Thus, the Schneider balancing test
tipped in favor of the government.91
The Court’s holding in Grayned was narrow, as it applied only to the slim
category of speech within a public forum that disrupted a public school.92 Still,
its analysis was significant and was utilized in other cases: the Court analyzed
the disruption caused by speech in both Edwards (in which a similar protest was
permitted outside of a governmental building)93 and Brown,94 though it found
no significant disruption in either case.95
5. The “Immemorial” Standard
Perhaps Hague’s biggest contribution to modern-day public forum
jurisprudence is its language describing the age-old nature of speech and
assembly in streets and parks: such venues have “immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”96 Courts have read this language as imposing a strict standard: for
speech in a public venue to receive the maximum level of First Amendment
protection, the forum must have some extended history of being used for the
exercise of First Amendment rights.97
87

Id. at 105.
Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 91, 95.
89
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117–18.
90
Id. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)). Grayned made clear
that the right to free speech, even in a public forum, is not absolute and is subject to “reasonable regulation.” Id.
at 116. For example, the government can limit more than one parade on a public street at a time. See Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). The government may also be able to limit a demonstration during rush
hour. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
91
See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 121.
92
Id. at 120–21. The Court called the regulation a “modest restriction” that represented a “considered and
specific legislative judgment.” Id. at 121. A less “modest restriction” may not have passed the Schneider
balancing test.
93
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 231–33 (1963).
94
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139–40 (1966) (plurality opinion).
95
Edwards, 372 U.S. at 231–33; Brown, 383 U.S. at 139–40 (plurality opinion).
96
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
97
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“The Court has rejected the
88
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The Supreme Court has wavered on how much history is enough to clear the
“immemorial” standard.98 One initial view was suggested in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad in 1975, in which the Court declared a governmentrented theater to be a public forum.99 The Conrad defendants—municipal board
members of a privately owned theater on lease to the city—rejected the
plaintiffs’ application to perform a particular musical, claiming that it would not
be “in the best interest of the community,” as the play contained nudity and
obscene language.100 The Court held this restriction on the plaintiffs’ speech to
be unconstitutional, noting that the censoring effect of the defendants’ actions
was “indistinguishable” from the unconstitutional restrictions of private speech
on sidewalks or public streets, because the theater was “designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities.”101 Essentially, the Court equated a public
space being “designed for . . . expressive activities”102 with one
“immemorially . . . used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”103 Hague’s “immemorial”
qualifier, when viewed through the Conrad prism, did not require that a public
forum be a bastion of communication since the dawn of time; it was sufficient
that the forum be explicitly created for such communication.104 In 1983,
however, the Court seemingly took a different stance in the massively influential
Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.105 Perry not only
changed the Court’s interpretation of the “immemorial” standard; it changed the
contours of the entire public forum doctrine.
B. The Perry Framework
Perry was a landmark case, establishing a concrete framework for the public
forum doctrine that largely replaced the Schneider balancing test and is still
utilized by courts today.106 It consolidated the core qualities of the public forum
doctrine into a rigid, three-part structure that applied different levels of judicial

view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.”).
98
Compare id. at 677 (noting that the highest level of protection for speech was afforded to forums with
a long history of assembly and debate), with Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552, 555–56 (1975)
(holding that a forum was entitled to the strongest levels of protection for public speech purely because it was
created for the explicit purpose of expressive activities and communication).
99
Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
100
Id. at 548.
101
Id. at 552, 555.
102
Id. at 555.
103
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
104
Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
105
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
106
See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
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scrutiny to government restrictions on speech depending on the type of forum at
issue.107
The case came about from a dispute between a teacher’s union and a public
school board, with the union claiming that the board infringed upon its First
Amendment rights by not permitting the union to use the school’s internal mail
system.108 In determining the level of protection afforded to speech within the
mailboxes, the Court split the public forum doctrine into three separate
categories, each consisting of a number of examples from prior decisions:
(1) “quintessential” or “traditional” public forums, (2) “limited” or “designated”
public forums, and (3) nonpublic forums.109
The first category, the “quintessential” public forum, essentially turned the
fifth “core quality” of the public forum into a threshold question.110 This
category—now referred to as the “traditional public forum”111—consists of
government venues that have been “immemorially . . . used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”112 This requirement has effectively limited the traditional public
forum to streets, parks, and sidewalks.113 Speech in these forums receives the
highest level of First Amendment protection.114 Any government restrictions on
speech in these forums are subject to strict judicial scrutiny; thus, the
government can only restrict speech if the restriction is “necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”115
The second category—eventually called the “limited” or “designated public
forum”116—represented more of a departure from the Court’s pre-Perry
jurisprudence. This category consists of “public property which the State has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity,” with the key

107

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
Id. at 38–41.
109
See id. at 45–46.
110
Id.
111
Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 652–54 (2010).
112
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. of Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 616 (1939) (plurality
opinion)).
113
See Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Loc. 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311
F.3d 534, 544 (2d Cir. 2002).
114
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
115
Id. (citation omitted).
116
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 814 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (identifying such forums as “limited public forums”); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2015) (identifying such forums as “designated public forums”).
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aspect being the state’s active decision to open the property to the public.117
While judicial treatment of this second category has been inconsistent through
the years,118 most courts agree on two main points regarding the second Perry
category: (1) as in the traditional public forum, restrictions on speech are subject
to strict scrutiny; and (2) the government can do either or both of the following:
(a) rescind the venue’s public forum status at will;119 or (b) at the forum’s
“opening” to the public, reasonably limit access to certain types of speakers or
certain uses.120 Essentially, the government may be able to limit the use of a
limited or designated public forum at its inception, and may be able to close the
forum to the public at its leisure, but as long as it keeps the forum open, “it is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”121 The
Court cited designated meeting rooms at a university122 and school board
meetings123 as examples of this type of forum. Interestingly, the Court also
declared the municipal theater from Conrad a limited public forum, despite
previously having compared it to the “streets and parks” of Hague.124
The third category, the nonpublic forum, consists of public properties that
are not classified as “forum[s] for public communication” whatsoever, but are
still subject to basic First Amendment protections.125 The government is given
much more leeway in imposing restrictions on speech in these properties; the
regulation merely has to be reasonable and not an effort to suppress unpopular
speech.126
The Perry Court held that the school mailboxes fell into this third
category,127 but the decision was ultimately less important for its holding and
more important for laying a concrete basis upon which the modern public forum
doctrine could be constructed. On the one hand, Perry was a natural extension
of the Court’s public doctrine jurisprudence—an extension of the balancing test
117

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
Compare Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (describing the second Perry category
as “limited (or designated) public forums”), with Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2242 (describing the limited and
designated public forums as two different entities within the second Perry category). This Comment discusses
the judicial confusion regarding the second Perry category and its implications in Part III.A.
119
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
120
Id. at 46 n.7.
121
Id. at 46.
122
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
123
Id. (citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)).
124
Id. at 45–46 (citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)); Conrad, 420 U.S. at 552,
555 (holding that the theater was “indistinguishable” from the Hague categories).
125
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 48.
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utilized in Schneider.128 While Schneider and its progeny used a less rigid
formula,129 the concept was similar: a “nonpublic forum” like the school
mailboxes, if examined under Schneider, would likely have a low level of
individual interest in free speech. Therefore, it would take a relatively low level
of government interest to tip the scales of the balancing test in favor of the
government. On the other hand, Perry was a strange and inflexible departure
from the cases that came before it. While cases like Hague and Schneider
allowed for a sliding scale approach to weigh the relative interests of the speaker
and the government,130 Perry elected to clean up the doctrine by creating a strict
three-category approach, with each type of forum having a distinct balancing
formula.131 Despite the abrupt jurisprudential shift and some resulting judicial
backlash,132 the three-part Perry framework is now the starting point for all
modern-day public forum analysis.133
II. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC FORUM AND GOVERNMENT-RUN
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
Since the birth of the Perry framework, the most fascinating developments
within public forum doctrine jurisprudence have come when courts have
attempted to apply Perry to online forums. The internet is a strange fit in the
rigid Perry triptych. It seems to fit perfectly under the traditional public forum
criterion of being “used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions,”134 but the “immemorial”
requirement is a difficult bar to clear—the internet is a modern invention
compared to traditional public forums like streets and parks, but it has been
intended for similar public uses since its inception.135 This Part discusses how
courts have applied Perry to the internet, beginning with the Supreme Court’s
first encounters with intangible public forums and concluding by examining a
128

See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
Compare id. (utilizing an informal balancing test to weigh an individual’s interest in free speech in a
forum against the government interest in the forum), with Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (creating a new test that
classified the forum into one of three categories based on the individual and government interests in the forum
before weighing the interests against each other).
130
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 165.
131
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
132
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 826 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
133
See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1535, 1547 (1998).
134
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion)
135
See, e.g., Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that
“[the internet] shares many of the characteristics of these traditional public fora”).
129
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string of cases in which courts extended the public forum to government-run
social media accounts.
A. The Public Forum Doctrine and the Internet
The idea of an intangible public forum first reached the Supreme Court in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund in 1985.136 Here, the
Court was faced with the issue of whether a federal charity fundraising drive
was permitted to exclude organizations from submitting a short written
statement in order to join the drive and generate fundraising.137 Though the
Court held that the fundraising drive was a nonpublic forum entitled to the
lowest level of First Amendment protection,138 Cornelius was still entirely
unprecedented in applying the Perry framework to intangible government
property. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that “a First Amendment
forum necessarily consists of tangible government property,”139 holding that the
relevant inquiry in defining a public forum is not identifying the physical
government property at issue, but rather identifying the specific forum to which
the speakers sought access.140 The speakers in Cornelius did not seek access to
physical government workplaces to promote themselves; they sought access to
the government fundraising drive.141 Thus, the fundraising drive, rather than a
physical government workplace, was the forum at issue.142 A decade later, the
Court utilized the same logic in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, but took it a step farther: it held that a student activities
fund was not only a public forum that could be analyzed under Perry, but a
limited public forum in which government restrictions on speech received strict
scrutiny.143
Rosenberger’s holding that an intangible forum could receive heightened
protection under Perry paved the way for United States v. American Library
Ass’n, in which the concept of the internet as a public forum came before the
136

See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788.
Id. at 790–93.
138
Id. at 806.
139
Id. at 800.
140
Id. at 801.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (holding that the
fund was “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable”). Rosenberger was decided on the ground that the restrictions amounted to unconstitutional
“viewpoint discrimination,” which cannot pass muster under any of the Perry forums, so its public forum
analysis was limited. Id. at 829–31. It still set a crucial precedent in granting an intangible public forum elevated
Perry status. Id. at 829–30.
137
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Supreme Court.144 The district court in American Library held that a
congressional act that aimed to block certain violent and pornographic web
content from public library computers was unconstitutional, as libraries would
be violating their visitors’ First Amendment rights by enforcing it.145 The district
court classified the internet at the public libraries as a designated public forum,
noting that internet access is, in the words of Perry, “for use by the public . . . for
expressive activity.”146 In a bolder step, the district court even suggested that the
internet in public libraries could rise to the first Perry category: a traditional
public forum.147 It conceded that “the provision of Internet access in a public
library does not enjoy the historical pedigree of streets, sidewalks, and parks as
a vehicle of free expression,” but added that the internet access promoted First
Amendment principles in an “analogous manner” to Hague’s streets and
parks.148 The internet, like public streets and parks, is open to the general public,
free of charge, and critically, is dedicated to “freewheeling inquiry” and the free
exchange of ideas.149
The Supreme Court was unmoved by the district court’s line of reasoning.
The Court’s logic in holding that internet access in a public library was not a
traditional public forum started and stopped with its failure to meet the
“immemorial” standard.150 As the internet itself “did not exist until quite
recently,” it did not qualify as a traditional public forum under Perry.151 Nor was
the Court convinced by the idea that the internet at the public library was a
limited public forum.152 The Court reiterated that to create such a forum, the
government needed to “make an affirmative choice” to open its property for
public use.153 Providing internet at a library, it reasoned, was not an “opening”
of the library to the free expression of internet speakers, but merely another
resource for its visitors.154 The Court thus declared that the internet at the library
was a nonpublic forum, and the library was permitted to block access to violent
and pornographic sites on its publicly available computers.155
144

United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 202–03.
146
Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
147
Id. at 466.
148
Id.
149
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
150
Am. Libr., 539 U.S. at 205 (plurality opinion).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 206–08.
153
Id. at 206.
154
Id. at 206–07. The internet at the library was “no more than a technological extension of the book
stack,” provided for the benefit of the library patrons, not the speakers themselves. Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
155
Id. at 208.
145
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As the internet, particularly social media, has gained cultural significance as
a means of communication and newsgathering, the Court’s views on First
Amendment protection for online speech have shifted. The Court took a
dramatic leap forward in 2017 in Packingham v. North Carolina, which veered
from American Library and entertained the possibility of the internet as a limited
or traditional public forum.156 The main issue in Packingham was the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited registered sex offenders from using
social media websites.157 The Court suggested that no Perry classification was
necessary, as the statute would not pass muster under any of the three standards;
it was an overly broad law that “burden[ed] substantially more speech than [was]
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”158 Nonetheless, the
opinion reflected a significant paradigm shift in the Court’s public forum
doctrine. Whereas American Library explicitly rejected the internet as a limited
or designated public forum, Packingham not only considered the possibility, but
seemed to endorse the internet as the new age “streets and parks” from Hague—
the very epitome of a traditional public forum.159 The Court classified the
internet, and “social media in particular,” as the most important venue for the
exchange of ideas in the modern era.160 It described social media as “perhaps the
most powerful [mechanism] available to a private citizen to make his or her
voice heard,” allowing “a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’”161 The
implication was clear: the Supreme Court was prepared to allow cyberspace into
the first two categories of the Perry framework, and perhaps even into the
hallowed halls of the traditional public forum.
B. The Public Forum Doctrine and Government-run Social Media Accounts
Perhaps fueled by Packingham, a number of cases emerged in 2017 that
forced courts to further examine the relationship between the public forum
doctrine and social media.162 While the forum at issue in Packingham was the
internet and social media as a whole,163 these new cases were concerned with
156

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017).
Id. at 1733–34.
158
Id. at 1736 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
159
See id. at 1735.
160
Id. (“Facebook has 1.79 billion active users. This is about three times the population of North
America.”).
161
Id. at 1737 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S.844, 870 (1997)).
162
See Davison v. Plowman (Davison I), 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 770 (E.D. Va. 2017); Davison v. Loudoun
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Davison II), 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706 (E.D. Va. 2017); Price v. City of New York,
No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
163
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733–34 (2017).
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government regulation and restrictions on government-run social media
accounts.164 This section examines courts’ treatment of the public forum
doctrine as applied to these accounts, and Packingham as applied to a new digital
frontier.
Among the first cases to challenge the restriction of speech on governmentrun social media accounts was Davison v. Plowman (“Davison I”), decided by
the Eastern District of Virginia in 2017.165 In Davison I, the plaintiff left a
comment on the Loudoun County Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook page
that was deleted by an employee of the county for being “off topic.”166 The
comment was posted in an attempt to raise awareness and apply “political
pressure” on the county for failing to prosecute one of its teachers for perjury.167
In evaluating whether this censorship was an unconstitutional infringement of
the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, the court was quick to apply the Perry
framework.168 It labeled the Facebook page a limited public forum;169 thus,
restrictions on the page were subject to strict scrutiny as long as the speech was
within the reasonable constraints imposed by the government at the forum’s
inception.170 The court noted that these constraints were determined by the
page’s social media policy, which stated that the purpose of the page was to
“present matters of public interest in Loudoun County,” and that the government
could delete any comments that were “clearly off topic.”171 In a two-part
analysis, the court reasoned that (1) the plaintiff’s comments—centered upon his
own personal issues with the government—were not sufficiently related to the
government’s Facebook post to be permitted under the social media policy, and
(2) restricting “clearly off topic” private speech was indeed a reasonable
constraint, permissible within the bounds of the second Perry category.172 Thus,
the government had acted within the limitations imposed by the limited public
forum and did not violate the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.173
The Eastern District of Virginia was faced with a similar issue the same year
in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors (“Davison II”), though its

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776; Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 706.
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767.
Id. at 771–74.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 776 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)).
Id.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (1983).
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776–77.
Id.
Id. at 777.
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analysis differed.174 This time, the plaintiff was banned by the Chair of the
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors from the Chair’s official Facebook page
for twelve hours after he left a comment accusing the Board of corruption and
conflicts of interest.175 Here, like in Packingham, the court stopped short of a
full-blown public forum analysis, holding that banning the plaintiff from the
page for his comment was unconstitutional “viewpoint discrimination,” which
would not pass muster under any of the Perry forums.176
At first glance, it might appear that the Eastern District of Virginia’s
reasoning in Davison I and Davison II took two similar comments on two similar
Facebook pages and arrived at two different conclusions. In the eyes of the court,
however, the different outcomes in Davison I and Davison II were largely the
result of two factors. First, the court believed the comment in Davison II was
more relevant to the intended uses of the Facebook page than the comment in
Davison I.177 The plaintiff’s comment in Davison II leveled accusations of
corruption against the school board on a post about a public town hall
discussion—notably, after the plaintiff had already asked a related question at
the town hall.178 In Davison I, the plaintiff commented on a post about the
county’s special prosecutors with a complaint about the county’s failure to
prosecute one of its officials for perjury.179 The court considered this connection
tenuous, stating that the comment “did not further any dialogue” about the
subject of the post nor “engage with the content or topic of the article.”180
Second, the government subjected the Facebook page in Davison I to much
stricter content guidelines—in essence, limiting the scope of the limited public
forum that it created.181 The Facebook page in Davison I was governed by a
social media policy that banned any content that was “clearly off topic.”182
Alternately, the Chair of the Board in Davison II held her Facebook page to a
much looser standard.183 She “deliberately permit[ted] public comment” on her
174

Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017).
Id. at 711.
176
Id. at 716–17.
177
Compare Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716 (noting that the plaintiff’s comment related to a topic
addressed in the Facebook post on which he commented), with Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777 (noting that
the plaintiff’s comment did not “engage with the content or topic” of the post on which he commented).
178
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710–11.
179
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777.
180
Id.
181
Compare Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777 (noting that the Facebook page banned any content that
was “clearly off topic”), with Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (noting that the Facebook page imposed no
concrete content restrictions on Facebook users).
182
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777.
183
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (“Defendant designates her ‘Chair Phyllis J. Randall’ Facebook
page as a channel through which her constituents are directed to contact her.”).
175
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page, writing that she “really want[ed] to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on
ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, or just your thoughts.”184 This
permission of unfettered discussion, the court reasoned, expanded the scope of
the public forum, which meant that banning a relevant comment was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.185 The court also noted that “critical
commentary regarding elected officials is the quintessential form” of speech that
the First Amendment was designed to protect, adding further constitutional
weight to the plaintiff’s comment.186
Though the jurisprudential lines were not entirely black-and-white in the
first two Davison cases, the court’s attempts to fit the new world of social media
into the Perry framework validated Packingham by explicitly designating
government-run social media accounts as limited public forums.187 Faced with
two possible strains of thought to follow regarding public forums and the
internet, the opinions also consciously chose to follow Packingham188 rather
than the Court’s majority opinion in American Library, which rejected the idea
of the internet as a public forum.189 Furthermore, they provided a standard for
similar cases in subsequent years. Courts across the country came to similar
conclusions as Packingham and Davison II in 2018 and 2019, holding that a fullblown Perry analysis was unnecessary when faced with a government official
restricting a private citizen’s speech on the official’s social media page due to a

184

Id. at 716.
Id. at 716–17. The court noted that “no policy—whether County-wide or specific to Defendant’s
office—played any role in Defendant’s decision to ban Plaintiff” from her Facebook page. Id. at 715.
186
Id. at 717.
187
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
188
Id. The Davison I court actually took it a step beyond Packingham, explicitly labeling the Facebook
page a limited public forum. Id. Davison II’s viewpoint discrimination conclusion more precisely mirrored
Packingham. Compare Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17 (holding that the Chair of the Board had engaged
in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in censoring the plaintiff’s speech on her Facebook page, thus it
was unnecessary to classify the Facebook page as a specific forum), with Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.
Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (declining to engage in a full-fledged Perry forum analysis because the restrictions at
issue would be unconstitutional no matter which forum was analyzed).
189
United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion).
185
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disagreeable comment or post.190 Such restrictions constituted viewpoint
discrimination.191
In May 2018, the debate on the level of First Amendment protection afforded
to citizens’ speech on government-run social media accounts reached the White
House. The Southern District of New York held in Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University v. Trump (“Trump I”) that then-President
Donald Trump’s efforts to block users from viewing or replying to his Twitter
account amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.192 Unlike many
of the cases that came before it, however, the court attempted to fit Trump’s
Twitter account into the Perry framework.193 The court began by conceding that
the Supreme Court had noted the similarities between the internet (particularly
social media) and Hague’s streets and parks insofar as both were “important
places . . . for the exchange of views” and “essential venues for public
gatherings,” but found the lack of “immemorial” history to be dispositive in
preventing Trump’s account from being classified as a traditional public
forum.194 However, it held that the account qualified as a designated public
forum, in large part because of the governmental intent behind its creation—
particularly, the government’s “policy and past practice,” as well as the forum’s
“compatibility with expressive activity.”195 Key factors in this analysis included
that (1) Trump’s account was fully viewable, open to the public for comment,
and did not impose any specific limits on its accessibility; (2) the account was
described by the government as a way for Trump to communicate with the
American people; and (3) the interactivity of Twitter is one of its defining
features.196 In fact, the court reasoned that Twitter was explicitly designed for
interaction, particularly for private users to “petition their elected representatives
and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”197
190
See Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-cv-00296-JAW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146894, at *42–43 (D. Me.
Aug. 29, 2018); Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666,
687 (4th Cir. 2019); Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *39
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018). A particularly interesting argument was raised in Price: whether government-run
social media accounts are subject to the government speech doctrine. Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at
*32. This doctrine removes any government speech from public forum analysis under the logic that First
Amendment restrictions do not apply when the government itself is speaking. Id. The court in Price was
unconvinced, holding that while the officials’ tweets themselves may have been government speech, the replies
from the plaintiff were not. Id. at *35–36.
191
See supra note 190.
192
Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
193
Id. at 573–75.
194
Id. at 574 (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)).
195
Id. at 574–75 (quoting Paulsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991)).
196
See id.
197
Id. (quoting Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36).
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The court’s logic in laying out these factors was reminiscent of the Eastern
District of Virginia’s public forum analysis in Davison I, which focused on
governmental intent when determining if a designated or limited public forum
had been created.198 While the governmental intent in Trump I was not as clearcut as the social media policy in Davison II, the government’s statement that
Trump was communicating “directly with you, the American people!” through
the account served the same purpose: carving out the boundaries of the speech
that the government was prepared to permit in its designated public forum.199
From that point onward, Trump I was decided largely in the same fashion as the
cases that came before it: with a finding that the government had engaged in
viewpoint discrimination that would have been unconstitutional in any type of
public forum.200 This application was a simple one. Trump blocked the users
after they criticized his policies, so his restrictions on free speech were issued
based on ideology and overstepped the free-communication boundaries upon
which the government had created its forum.201
Trump appealed the case to the Second Circuit, which issued an opinion in
July 2019 that affirmed the judgment of the district court and largely affirmed
its reasoning (“Trump II”).202 Most notably, the Second Circuit elected not to go
as far as the district court in its Perry analysis, instead resting upon the triedand-true theory that there was no need to determine the type of public forum at
issue because the government was engaging in viewpoint discrimination.203 The
court concluded, however, by praising the role that social media has played in
the growth of communication and public discourse, noting that as a result, the
“conduct of our government and its officials is subject to wide-open, robust
debate” to a degree not seen before in American society.204 “This debate,” it
reasoned, “as uncomfortable and as unpleasant as it frequently may be, is
nonetheless a good thing.”205
The Trump cases left social media in a gray area in the public forum analysis.
Courts unanimously agreed that government-run social media accounts
constitute some type of public forum and that third-party replies and comments
on these social media platforms are protected by the First Amendment, but there

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

See id. at 574–75; Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 776–77 (E.D. Va. 2017).
Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Trump II, 928 F.3d 226, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2019).
Id. at 237–39.
Id. at 240.
Id.
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was little consensus otherwise. Davison II, Price, and the Second Circuit in
Trump II all held that viewpoint discrimination is prohibited on government-run
social media accounts, but offered little in terms of concrete additions to the
doctrine.206 Davison I and the Southern District of New York in Trump I both
held that government-run social media accounts were limited or designated
public forums, entitling speech within them to nearly unlimited protection so
long as the speech was within the constraints imposed by the government in
creating the forums.207
Each case and each court, however, had one thing in common: an
appreciation for social media’s critical role in fostering communication and its
similarities to the “streets and parks” that Justice Roberts wrote about in 1939.208
In a memorandum opinion issued before Davison I, the Eastern District of
Virginia noted that “metaphysical” forums can be formed for the purpose of
“engag[ing] . . . local government.”209 In Davison II, the court held that in
creating a Facebook page, “one generally opens a digital space for the exchange
of ideas and information” that can permit “virtually unfettered discussion.”210
The Second Circuit in Trump II added that the “basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press” in the First Amendment “do not vary” when applied to
new technology.211 While these cases ultimately reached no consensus on social
media’s place within the public forum doctrine, they undoubtedly reinforced the
Supreme Court’s Packingham opinion, providing fuel to Justice Kennedy’s
theory of the internet as the “modern public square.”212
III. GOVERNMENT-RUN SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUMS
The case law surrounding government-run social media accounts as public
forums is still hazy and limited. To this day, the Supreme Court is yet to address
206
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 2017); Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5871
(KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018); Trump II, 928 F.3d at 237–39 (2d
Cir. 2019).
207
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 776 (E.D. Va. 2017); Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
208
See Trump II, 928 F.3d at 240 (“The irony in all of this is that we write at a time in the history of this
nation when the conduct of our government and its officials is subject to . . . a level of passion and intensity the
likes of which have rarely been seen.”).
209
Davison v. Plowman, No. 1:16cv180 (JCC/IDD), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan.
10, 2017). The Eastern District of Virginia noted in a memorandum opinion issued before its Davision I opinion
that it considered the Facebook page a limited public forum. Id.
210
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
211
Trump II, 928 F.3d at 237 (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)).
212
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).

SMITH_3.8.21

982

3/9/2021 11:01 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:955

the issue in terms more substantial than its Packingham opinion. That said, the
last half-decade of lower court decisions has supplied two key principles for
further First Amendment jurisprudence that seem unanimously accepted.
First, government-run social media is, at the very least, a limited or
designated public forum, and thus restrictions on speech within it will receive
strict scrutiny review.213 In the memorandum opinion issued before Davison I,
the key factor for the Eastern District of Virginia was the “purposeful
government action” to make the forum available for public use;214 in Trump II,
the court analyzed the government’s intent, calling it the “touchstone” for
determining the existence of a limited public forum.215 In both cases, (1) the
social media accounts were entirely open to the public, (2) the government had
made statements declaring that the accounts were means of communication with
the public, and (3) the accounts were interactive by nature and allowed for
constituents to respond to their government officials.216 In the cases without a
full-fledged public forum analysis, no court displayed any reluctance to label
government-run social media accounts as limited or designated public forums;
they merely stopped their analyses at viewpoint discrimination.217
This Comment notes that government-run social media accounts are “at
least” limited or designated public forums, because several courts have left open
the Packingham Court’s suggestion that these social media accounts could better
be classified as new age traditional public forums.218 Even the courts that
actively chose not to extend the traditional public forum to include governmentrun social media accounts devoted little time to the issue beyond noting the
accounts’ failure to check Hague’s “immemorial” box.219 The Southern District
of New York noted in Trump I that the Supreme Court had “analogized the
internet to the ‘essential venues for public gatherings’ of streets and parks,” but
pivoted and held that “the lack of historical practice [within social media] is

213

See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776; Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Davison, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348, at *8–9.
215
Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574–75 (quoting Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279
(2d Cir. 1997)).
216
See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776; Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574–75.
217
See Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 2017); Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ.
5871 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018); Trump II, 928 F.3d 226, 237–
39 (2d Cir. 2019).
218
See Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716 (noting that “the Court would ordinarily endeavor to determine
the precise ‘nature of the forum’ at issue—whether it is a traditional, limited, or non-public forum. The Court,
however, need not pass on the issue”). The court added that “Facebook pages are designed to be public spaces”
that can contain “virtually unfettered discussion.” Id.
219
See Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *37–38; Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
214
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dispositive.”220 A year later, the court in Price v. New York was even less
definitive, holding that it would be “inclined to find that the City’s official
Twitter accounts do not constitute a traditional public forum,” due to the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend the traditional public forum “beyond its
historical confines,” but it elected not to make a classification.221 Otherwise,
courts’ language has been largely noncommittal and has often echoed
Packingham.222
Second, the government is not permitted to exercise viewpoint
discrimination on its official social media accounts. Viewpoint discrimination
occurs when government restrictions on private speech in a public forum are
imposed to different degrees depending on the speaker’s expressed viewpoint.223
In Pleasant Grove v. Summum, the Supreme Court held that viewpoint
discrimination was not allowed in any of the three Perry forums: traditional,
limited or designated, or nonpublic forums.224 Since, as noted above,
government-run social media accounts currently rest on an established “limited
or designated public forum” baseline, it follows naturally that viewpoint
discrimination is prohibited on these accounts. Indeed, Packingham,225 Davison
II,226 Price,227 and Trump II228 all explicitly confirmed this.
These two principles are valuable starting points as courts continue to figure
out how to fit Perry into the digital age. However, to stop the Perry analysis of
government-run social media accounts here would be to unnecessarily truncate
the holdings of a century of public forum jurisprudence. The remainder of this
Part argues that government-run social media accounts should be classified as
traditional public forums, and thus speech within them should be subject to the
same level of protection as speech in Hague’s streets and parks. The first section

220
Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (first quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735
(2017); then citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)).
221
Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *37–38 (quoting Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678).
222
See, e.g., Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
223
Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *39 (“‘[V]iewpoint discrimination’ is ‘an egregious form of
content discrimination’ in which the government ‘targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995))).
224
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461, 470 (2009) (holding that even in a nonpublic
forum, the weakest of the three Perry categories, the government may only impose “restrictions on speech that
are reasonable and viewpoint neutral” (citing Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07
(2001))).
225
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
226
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17.
227
Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *39–40.
228
Trump II, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019).
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examines the practical necessity of labeling these accounts traditional public
forums as opposed to limited or designated public forums. The second section
shows that government-run social media accounts encompass four of the five
“core qualities” of the traditional public forum better than streets and parks. The
third and final section shows that courts’ hesitance to extend traditional public
forum status to these accounts is based on an overreliance on the fifth core
quality: Hague’s “immemorial” standard. It suggests that the “immemorial”
standard should not be an absolute bar to traditional public forum status, and that
a more workable standard can be found in both Perry and the cases preceding it.
A. The Implications of the Limited or Designated Public Forum Versus the
Traditional Public Forum
Before examining why the traditional public forum doctrine should extend
to government-run social media accounts, there is a crucial threshold issue to
address, one responsible for much of the post-Packingham inertia surrounding
social media and public forums: if, as the Supreme Court mentioned in Perry,
restrictions on traditional public forums and limited or designated public forums
are held to the same level of strict scrutiny,229 then what is the practical
difference between labeling government-run social media as a limited or
designated public forum instead of a traditional public forum? In more practical
terms, if the restrictions on speech by the government in Trump II would have
been unconstitutional no matter the type of forum,230 then why does the type of
forum matter?
The answer to these questions can be found in Perry’s murky second
category. While the first and third Perry categories have been unanimously
adopted and treated nearly identically across jurisdictions, the middle category
is unclear and has invited further judicial exploration.231 This confusion began
with the language of Perry: while Perry does hold that its second category, the
limited or designated public forum, “is bound by the same standards as apply in
a traditional public forum,” it adds two key qualifiers.232 First, because a forum
in the second Perry category may be actively opened by the state to the public—
as opposed to a traditional public forum that requires no formal government

229
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
230
Trump II, 928 F.3d at 237, 239.
231
See Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *30–31 (classifying the limited public forum as a subset
of the designated public forum); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (referring to designated
and limited public forums interchangeably).
232
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.

SMITH_3.8.21

2021]

3/9/2021 11:01 AM

THE NEW-AGE STREETS AND PARKS

985

“opening” because it has been a place of public discourse since its inception,
such as a park—the state may not be “required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility.”233 Second, a forum in the second Perry category may
be created for a specific purpose, such as “use by certain groups” or “discussion
of certain subjects.”234
Courts have treated these two qualifiers in two different ways, with some
applying both of them to the second Perry category235 and others splitting the
second Perry category into two separate forums, each subject to one of these
qualifiers.236 This section evaluates these two separate strands of
jurisprudence—categorized here as the “hybrid theory” and the “subset
theory”—and shows that both, in practice, fail to provide the same First
Amendment protection as the traditional public forum.
1. The Hybrid Theory
The hybrid theory classifies the second Perry category as either one of two
interchangeable labels: the “limited public forum” or the “designated public
forum.”237 Courts that follow this line of reasoning view these two forums as
merely different ways of referring to the same concept: a middle-ground
government forum that allows for government restrictions on private speech,
provided that the restrictions fall within the boundaries created by the
government when opening the forum for public use.238 Speech within this forum
receives the same strict scrutiny as speech in a traditional public forum, so long
as the speech clears the preliminary hurdles imposed by the government (such
as restrictions on particular groups or subjects).239 The Supreme Court seemed
to endorse the hybrid theory in Cornelius, noting that there were “three types of
fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government

233

Id. at 46.
Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted).
235
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (explaining that a
designated public forum may be created “for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects”
(citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 46 n.7)); Randall, 912 F.3d at 687 (finding a Facebook page constituted a public
forum when it was created for users to discuss certain issues).
236
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2015) (noting that
forums are designated “as either a designated public forum . . . or a limited public forum”) (emphasis added);
Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *31 (“A limited public forum is a subset of the designated public
forum.”).
237
See, e.g., Randall, 912 F.3d at 687 (equating the designated public forum and the limited public forum).
238
See, e.g., Warren v. Fairfax Cnty., 196 F.3d 186, 193–94 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing designated public
forum and limited public forum as interchangeable terms).
239
See id.
234
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designation, and the nonpublic forum.”240 The Fourth Circuit did so more
explicitly in Davison v. Randall in 2019, referring to the second category as
“designated or limited public forum[s].”241
In theory, government restrictions in a limited or designated forum under the
hybrid theory receive the same level of scrutiny as in a traditional public
forum.242 In practice, however, there is a massive divide between judicial
treatment of these forums. The different outcomes in Davison I and Davison II
are a result of this disparate treatment.243 In Davison I, the Loudoun County
Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook post was about the appointment of new
special prosecutors, and the plaintiff’s comment was a question about the
county’s failure to pursue a perjury charge.244 The comment was directly
addressed to the county,245 and addressed the topic of the post, special
prosecutors.246 In Davison II, the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors posted on her Facebook page about a town hall discussion held by
the board, and the plaintiff’s comment on the post alleged unethical conflicts of
interest among the board members.247 Both Facebook pages were classified as
public forums, as the Davison I court explicitly labeled the Facebook page a
limited public forum248 and the Davison II court stopped short of a full Perry
classification and ended its analysis at “public forum.”249 Nonetheless, these two
cases—both decided by the Eastern District of Virginia—came out differently:
in Davison I, the court held that the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was
without merit,250 and in Davison II, the court held that the government restriction
on the plaintiff’s speech was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.251
The reason for these different outcomes was the governmental intent in
creating each Facebook page. While the county’s social media policy in Davison
I outlawed any content that was “clearly off topic,”252 the chair of the board in
240

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
Randall, 912 F.3d at 687.
242
See id. at 681 (noting that government entities are “strictly limited” in their ability to impose restrictions
on either type of forum).
243
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716–18 (E.D. Va. 2017); Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 777–78
(E.D. Va. 2017).
244
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 771–73.
245
Id. at 773 (“So I have a question for the Loudoun County Commonwealth Attorney’s Office . . . .”).
246
Id. (“[W]ouldn’t you at least assign a special prosecutor in this case?”).
247
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710–11.
248
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
249
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–18.
250
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776–78.
251
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–18.
252
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 772.
241
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Davison II posted that she “really want[ed] to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen
on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, or just your thoughts.”253 Both
of the comments shared a common subject with their respective government
Facebook posts (special prosecutors in Davison I,254 and comments and
complaints for the board in Davison II).255 However, the government restriction
on speech was able to satisfy the second Perry category’s version of strict
scrutiny in Davison I purely because the county instituted a social media policy
banning off-topic content,256 while a similar restriction in Davison II was struck
down as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.257
This disparity reveals a massive practical flaw in the supposedly identical
level of scrutiny that traditional public forums and limited or designated public
forums receive under the hybrid theory: there is a nearly unfettered ability for
governmental intent to control the boundaries of speech in the hybrid theory’s
second Perry category. Government restrictions on speech in the hybrid theory’s
limited or designated public forum do receive strict scrutiny,258 but they receive
strict scrutiny only after the limits of the forum have been created by the
government. This weakens the effectiveness of strict scrutiny review and
undermines its purpose, allowing the government to institute significantly more
restrictions on private speech than it can in traditional public forums.
Furthermore, it puts pressure on courts to decide the limits and the application
of governmental intent. The ban on “off-topic content” in Davison I was a broad,
non-specific policy that the court held was applicable to a comment directly
addressing the subject of the government’s Facebook post.259 This essentially
creates two extra hurdles for speech in Perry’s second category to clear: not only
the government’s intent in creating and maintaining the limits of the forum,260
but also the court’s reading of the scope and applicability of governmental
intent.261 Neither of these hurdles are applicable to speech in traditional public
forums.262

253

Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 771–73.
255
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710–11.
256
See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777–78.
257
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–18.
258
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 37, 45–46 (1983).
259
See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 777–78.
260
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
261
See Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711, 716 (finding the fact that the government intended to allow
“virtually unfettered” public discussion on a Facebook page indicated it was a public forum).
262
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
254
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2. The Subset Theory
Some courts have read a possible solution to this unequal treatment into the
second category of the Perry doctrine by separating the limited and designated
public forum into two distinct entities.263 This view, referred to here as the subset
theory, considers the limited public forum to be a subset of the designated public
forum, with slight differences in treatment of private speech between the two.264
While the limited public forum under the subset theory is essentially the same
as the hybrid theory version, the designated public forum is much different. It is
classified as a “place not traditionally open to public assembly and
debate . . . that the government has taken affirmative steps to open for general
public discourse.”265 This view has been explicitly utilized by the Supreme
Court,266 as well as the Southern District of New York in Price.267
On the surface, this theory seems to provide a lifeline for speech within the
second Perry category. Unlike government restrictions on speech in the hybrid
theory, restrictions in this designated public forum actually do receive the same
scrutiny as speech within a traditional public forum. There is, however, one
massive qualifier: this protection only lasts as long as the government continues
to designate the “non-traditional” forum for public use.268 While a traditional
public forum, like a park, cannot be “closed” for the purposes of private speech
by the government, a designated public forum, such as a public school “opened”
for a town hall, can be “closed” and become a nonpublic forum in a moment’s
notice. This qualification also allows for judicial variability in determining when
a forum is “opened” or “closed” by the government. More issues arise when
examining an intangible or online forum like social media: how can courts
determine when a Twitter account, for instance, is “closed” to the public? Does
a Twitter account close if the government official stops using it? Does it close if
the government blocks members of the public from viewing the account?
These questions illustrate the lingering uncertainty surrounding the second
Perry category, and its weakness, no matter the form, when compared to the
traditional public forum. The subset theory’s designated public forum
undoubtedly provides stronger and more absolute protections for private speech
than the hybrid theory’s second Perry category, but it still fails to provide the
263
See Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *30–31
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
264
See id. at *31 (“A limited public forum is a subset of the designated public forum.”).
265
Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 2005).
266
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2015).
267
Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *30–31.
268
Id.
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same level of protection as the traditional public forum. In particular, it fails to
avoid the same pitfalls that plague the second Perry category in all its forms,
remaining subject to governmental and judicial whims.269 No matter the theory,
Perry’s second category allows the government to either (1) hold permanent
control over the availability of the forum to the public, or (2) shape the
boundaries of acceptable speech in the forum through its intention in opening it.
While these issues have only rarely come to a head—as many of the public
forum cases involving government-run social media accounts have been decided
on viewpoint discrimination grounds before reaching a Perry analysis270—there
have already been warning signs. The divergent outcomes in Davison I and
Davison II, for instance, show that if a forum is not classified as a traditional
public forum, the speech within it will be subject to arbitrary levels of protection
based on governmental intent and judicial line drawing.271 Had the government
action in Trump II, for instance, not been viewpoint discrimination—or, in
practical terms, had Trump blocked users from viewing his Twitter account not
because they expressed views that disagreed with him, but merely on an
indiscriminate basis—the designated public forum and limited public forum
would provide no guarantee that such indiscriminate censorship would be held
unconstitutional.
B. The Core Qualities in Government-run Social Media Accounts
Having addressed the practical differences between traditional public forums
and limited or designated public forums and the resulting implications for their
treatment of private speech, the remainder of this Part shows why governmentrun social media accounts should be classified as traditional public forums. This
section examines four of the “five core qualities” of the traditional public forum
and shows that government-run social media accounts better encompass these
qualities today than Hague’s streets and parks.
1. Society’s Most Important Place for the Exercise of Free Speech
In 1939, the Supreme Court considered streets and parks among the most
important places for the exercise of free speech in the United States272—if not

269
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 826 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (warning that “if the government’s ability to define the boundaries of a limited public forum is
unconstrained, the limited-public-forum concept is meaningless”).
270
See Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 2017); Price, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815,
at *39–40; Trump II, 928 F.3d 226, 237–39 (2d Cir. 2019).
271
See Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–18; Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 777–78 (E.D. Va. 2017).
272
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (plurality opinion).
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the most important places. This idea is the bedrock upon which the entire public
forum doctrine lies. Hague spoke of the importance of these places to the basic
First Amendment rights of American citizens, calling it a “privilege of a citizen
of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions” that “must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.”273 In subsequent public forum cases, the Court added that “the streets
are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion”274 and suggested that “one who is rightfully on a street which the state
has left open to the public carries with him . . . the constitutional right to express
his views in an orderly fashion.”275
Over seventy-five years later, the Court suggested that Hague’s streets and
parks have been eclipsed by social media in importance to private speech.276
Packingham acknowledged that social media had become the “most important
place[] . . . for the exchange of views” in society, calling it the “modern public
square.”277 This is not the only time courts have suggested that social media’s
status as a critical facilitator of speech should entitle speech within it to the
highest levels of First Amendment protection. In 2002, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania wrote in American Library that “[r]egulation of speech in streets,
sidewalks, and parks is subject to the highest scrutiny not simply by virtue of
history and tradition, but also because [of their] speech-facilitating character,”
as “[m]any of these same speech-promoting features of the traditional public
forum appear in public libraries’ provision of Internet access.”278 In 2018, in the
wake of Packingham and Trump II, legal commentators labeled social media
“the most important public for[um] of our time,”279 and noted that the idea of
government-run social media accounts as traditional public forums may be
“appropriate given evolving social standards.”280 Refusal to extend the
traditional public forum to include these accounts would unnecessarily bind the
doctrine to the physical spaces of streets and parks rather than the interests that
they protect—an approach that the Court explicitly cautioned against adopting

273

Id.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
275
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
276
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, 1737 (2017).
277
Id.
278
Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
279
James M. LoPiano, Comment, Public Fora Purpose: Analyzing Viewpoint Discrimination on the
President’s Twitter Account, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 511, 549–50 (2018).
280
Samantha Briggs, Comment, The Freedom of Tweets: The Intersection of Government Use of Social
Media and Public Forum Doctrine, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 29 n.142 (2018).
274
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in United States v. Kokinda in 1990, when it held that “[t]he mere physical
characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis.”281
2. Cost-Free Access to Government Officials Through Assembly and
Petition
Protecting citizens’ right to assemble and protest is a quintessential part of
the public doctrine, baked into public forum jurisprudence long before Perry
arose.282 The Court used the doctrine to defend, among other activities, students
peacefully protesting laws on public grounds283 and protestors engaging in a sitin at a racially segregated public library.284 In his 1965 article, which essentially
coined the term “public forum,” Harry Kalven, Jr. suggested that “in an open
and democratic society[,] the streets, the parks, and other public places are an
important facility for public discussion and political process,” and noted that
most of the civil rights demonstrations of the era had taken place in such
forums.285 Even Hague, the cornerstone of the doctrine,286 explicitly mentioned
that public forums are inherently used for “assembly . . . and communication of
views on national questions.”287
Government-run social media accounts facilitate assembly and petition to
provide access to government officials in a way that is impossible for Hague’s
streets and parks to match. Unlike streets or parks, social media (1) grants users
an unprecedented ability to exercise their right to assembly with millions of other
citizens with no geographical limits,288 and (2) allows citizens to air their
grievances via immediate and direct access to almost any official in the
country.289
Few if any modern-day venues allow citizens to exercise their freedoms of
assembly more effectively than social media. Social media’s unique ability to
foster the First Amendment right to assembly lies largely in the fact that it allows

281

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
See Kalven, supra note 43, at 11–12; Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939)
(plurality opinion).
283
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963).
284
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion).
285
Kalven, supra note 43, at 11–12.
286
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16 (plurality opinion).
287
Id.
288
See Lydrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1977 (2011) (“Interactive social media
have the potential to initiate public discourse among citizens who might otherwise never interact . . . .”).
289
See id. at 1978 (“[I]nteractive social media can foster citizens’ First Amendment rights to speak, receive
information, associate with fellow citizens, and petition government for redress of grievances.”).
282
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unprecedented access to other citizens, locally, nationally, and internationally.290
It is no longer necessary for a citizen to go to a town square to exercise her First
Amendment right of assembly with other citizens; she is able to reach a huge
portion of her community—and even the world at large—merely by making a
Facebook post.291 On a local level, Facebook groups allow users instantaneous
access to and communication with members of their town, city, or school.292
Nationally, social media provides immediate access to nearly three-quarters of
the nation: in 2019, over 69% of Americans had some sort of social media
profile.293 Internationally, social media has drawn worldwide attention to local
protests and political revolutions.294 As of mid-2018, over 262 million Twitter
users were citizens of countries other than the United States.295 It is not
hyperbole to say that social media allows U.S. citizens to exercise their freedoms
of speech and assembly to a degree that could not have been imagined in 1939,
when Hague was decided.
Social media also furthers citizens’ First Amendment right to petition, as its
incredible reach extends not just to fellow citizens, but also to elected
government officials.296 Government-run social media accounts allow citizens
an unprecedented opportunity to interact with and respond directly to their
elected officials, no matter where they live or the time of the day.297 In 2016,
every single U.S. Senator and Governor utilized a social media account.298 These
accounts have become critical means of communication between the officials
and their constituents.299 Donald Trump’s Twitter account—which he described
as “a modern form of communication” that helped him to win the 2016
290

See id. at 1977–78.
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (calling social media “the modern
public square”).
292
See Elise Moreau, Everything You Need to Know About Facebook Groups, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 10, 2019),
https://www.lifewire.com/facebook-groups-4103720 (“A Facebook Group is a place for group communication
and for people to share their common interests and express their opinion. They let people come together around
a common cause, issue or activity to organize, express objectives, discuss issues, post photos, and share related
content.”).
293
Elijah Hack, Comment, The Marketplace of Twitter: Social Media and the Public Forum Doctrine, 88
U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 315 (2019).
294
Jina Moore, Social media: Did Twitter and Facebook Really Build a Global Revolution?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (June 30, 2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2011/0630/Social-media-DidTwitter-and-Facebook-really-build-a-global-revolution.
295
Shannon Tien, Top Twitter Demographics that Matter to Social Media Marketers, HOOTSUITE (June
16, 2018), https://blog.hootsuite.com/twitter-demographics/.
296
See Lidsky, supra note 288, at 1978.
297
See id.
298
Briggs, supra note 280, at 2.
299
See Lidsky, supra note 288, at 1978 (noting “citizens are less likely to seek out a government-sponsored
social media presence that does not” offer the interactive features of Facebook groups).
291
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presidential election300—had nearly eighty-nine million followers before its
suspension,301 and was used for over 11,000 tweets while Trump was in
office.302 Joe Biden defeated Trump in the 2020 presidential election in large
part because of his voter outreach efforts on social media, which included
livestreamed discussions with his supporters.303 Regular social media use is a
logical move for government officials, as “communication with the public via
electronic means such as social media is inexpensive, has a wide reach, and is
virtually instantaneous.”304 Over the last decade, Twitter and other social media
sites have helped spur political revolutions in Iran, Libya, and Egypt, among
other countries, by providing citizens with a platform to organize protests,
distribute photographs and live videos, and share information with other
countries that their government would otherwise censor.305 Peter Hirshberg, a
senior fellow at the Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership & Policy
at the University of Southern California, described social media as a “catalytic
part” of these revolutions.306 Omar Amer, a representative of the Libyan Youth
Movement, noted that “[w]ithout social media, . . . the global reaction to [antigovernment protests in] Libya would have been much softer, and very much
delayed.”307 Social media’s unique capability to give citizens constant access to
their elected officials and to communicate with other citizens worldwide serves
as a constant check against unconstitutional government overreach.
Government-run social media accounts also satisfy American Library’s
suggestion that citizens’ interest in a public forum is strengthened if the access
the forum provides to government officials is cost-free.308 The Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in American Library noted that the internet in a public library
might qualify as a traditional public forum, in part because “[t]he only direct
cost to library patrons who wish to receive information, whether via the Internet
or the library’s print collection, is the time spent reading.”309 Similarly, the only
cost to the citizen in interacting with government officials is an internet
300
Lesley Stahl, President-Elect Trump Speaks to a Divided Country, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-donald-trump-family-melania-ivanka-lesley-stahl/.
301
Cristiano Lima, Twitter Boots Trump, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/
01/08/twitter-suspends-trump-account-456730.
302
Nicole Lyn Pesce, Trump Hits Uncharted Territory While Reacting to His Impeachment Trial,
MARKETWATCH (Jan. 23, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-trump-unleashed-thesecharts-show-that-the-president-is-tweeting-and-speaking-more-than-ever-2019-09-23.
303
See Heilwell, supra note 3.
304
Briggs, supra note 280, at 2.
305
Moore, supra note 294.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 466–67 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
309
Id. at 467.
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connection—and with the ubiquity of the internet, even this cost is fading.310
Like other traditional public forums, government-run social media accounts
encourage democratic values by being easy to access and not “[charging]
members of the public each time they use the forum.”311
3. A Need to Curb Arbitrary Exercise of Government Power
Protection against arbitrary exercise of government power has been a goal
of the public forum since its conception.312 In Kunz, the Court found an
ordinance unconstitutional in part because it vested largely unchecked discretion
in an administrative official to enforce “broad criteria” as to what speech and
speakers were permitted in the forum.313 Kunz and other pre-Perry cases made
clear that the government cannot police a public forum using vague standards,
or even interpret concrete standards in a vague or arbitrary manner.314 For
example, a clear standard proposed and ratified by a legislative body strengthens
the government’s interest in a public forum; the interest is strengthened further
if the standard is applied rationally and without individual discretion.
Government-run social media accounts are rarely subject to such clear and
rational standards.315 Policies that govern a social media account, unlike those
governing public, physical forums, are often created and enforced by a single
person, which leads to arbitrary censorship via vague or nonexistent
standards.316 In Davison I, the government created and followed a social media
policy for its Facebook page, but the policy allowed government officials free
rein in limiting dialogue on the page to the loose standard of “matters of public
interest in Loudoun County,” and restricted comments that were “clearly off
topic.”317 The policy provided no guidance for determining what was a “matter
of public interest” or “clearly off topic,” and the decision to censor private
speech ultimately fell to one person.318 In Davison II, the page was not governed
by any social media policy at all, and the government official censored speech
purely based on her personal preference.319 Affording government-run social

310

See id. at 466–67 (discussing the availability of the internet in public libraries).
Id. at 467.
312
See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951).
313
Id.
314
Id.; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90–91 (1965).
315
See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 776 (E.D. Va. 2017); Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 717 (E.D.
Va. 2017).
316
See Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776; Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 717.
317
Davison I, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
318
Id.
319
Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 717.
311
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media the strongest level of protection under the Perry public forum doctrine is
critical to ensuring that government officials do not act arbitrarily in censoring
the speech of their constituents.
4. Limited Disruption
The Supreme Court’s pre-Perry jurisprudence made clear that the more
disruption caused by citizens’ speech, the lower the individual interest in speech
within the forum, and the less First Amendment protection afforded to the
speech.320 In Grayned, the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting a protest that
“materially disrupt[ed] classwork” at a public school was not a violation of the
First Amendment, as avoiding disruption was a legitimate government interest
that weighed against the protection of private speech.321 The disruption was even
more concerning in a forum where other legitimate government interests were
implicated, such as a public school.322
Social media raises no such concerns. Interaction over social media—even
a protest—is virtual and often instantaneous.323 Users can exercise their First
Amendment rights to petition and assembly from their own homes, limiting
disruption in a way that cannot be limited in streets or parks.324 To voice
displeasure publicly with a government policy, a citizen need not march on the
legislative building as the protestors in Edwards did;325 she can merely, from
thousands of miles away, comment on a government official’s Facebook post or
reply to a tweet. This, in turn, implicates a low level of government interest and
bolsters the relative strength of the citizens’ interest in private speech.

320
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
231–33 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139–40 (1966) (plurality opinion).
321
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118.
322
Id. at 120.
323
See Peter Maggiore, Note, Viewer Discretion Is Advised: Disconnects Between the Marketplace of
Ideas and Social Media Used to Communicate Information During Emergencies and Public Health Crises, 18
MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 627, 628 (2012) (“[S]ocial media has become a useful way to disseminate
information to a large group of people with little cost in terms of time[.]”).
324
Compare id. (discussing the convenience and limited cost of social media), with Edwards, 372 U.S. at
237 (“[F]reedom of speech . . . is . . . protected against censorship of punishment, unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest[.]” (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949))).
325
Edwards, 372 U.S. at 230.
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C. The Missing Link: The Unnecessary Rigidity of the “Immemorial”
Standard
The courts’ main (and often only) objection to expansion of the traditional
public forum to social media is a strict adherence to the “immemorial” language
from Hague.326 This is the only hurdle that government-run social media
accounts cannot easily clear. In Trump I, the Southern District of New York held
that Donald Trump’s Twitter page could not be classified as a traditional public
forum because there was “no historical practice of the interactive space of a
tweet being used for public speech and debate since time immemorial, for there
is simply no extended historical practice as to the medium of Twitter.”327
Similarly, in American Library, the Supreme Court held that the internet could
not be a traditional public forum because it “did not exist until quite recently.”328
Even outside of the courts, many legal scholars have assumed that this lack of
history is dispositive.329
While this strict application of the “immemorial” requirement is wellintentioned, it is misguided. This section shows that the famous Hague language
should be treated as less of a rigid standard and more of an important, but not
dispositive, factor to be weighed among the other “core qualities” of the
traditional public forum. The section is split into two subsections, each of which
addresses a different misreading in the development of the public forum
doctrine: first, the Perry Court’s overly narrow reading of pre-Perry
jurisprudence, and second, courts’ overly narrow reading of Perry itself.
1. A Misreading of Pre-Perry Jurisprudence: “Designed for and Dedicated
to”
The Perry three-part framework is the cornerstone of all public forum
analysis today,330 ubiquitous to the point that it becomes easy to forget that Perry
was merely a summation of the forty-three years of case law that preceded it.331
In fact, Perry was the first time that the Court attempted any sort of classification
within the public forum doctrine beyond a binary yes-or-no system for

326

See Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id.
328
United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion).
329
See Briggs, supra note 280, at 29 n.142; Lidsky, supra note 288, at 1983.
330
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
331
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). Perry was an attempt
by the Court to group the prior century of public forum cases into lines of best fit. See id.
327
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government-owned properties.332 In determining the grounds for the traditional
public forum, the Court in Perry relied largely on Justice Roberts’s tried-andtrue language from Hague: any government properties that had “immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, [had] been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions” were classified as traditional public forums.333
Courts have viewed this temporal standard as an absolute prohibition on
expanding the traditional public forum to anything other than streets, parks,
sidewalks, or their functional equivalents, regardless of whether the forum in
question shares other similarities with this time-honored group.334 Examples of
forums that could not clear this lofty bar under the Perry standard include public
theaters,335 the internet in a public library,336 and, of course, government-run
social media accounts.337
Each of these forums would likely have been afforded the highest standard
of constitutional protection under the Supreme Court’s pre-Perry
jurisprudence.338 In the Court’s analysis in Grayned, eleven years before Perry,
it did not make a single mention of whether public sidewalks were
“immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public” when determining
whether to extend the Hague “streets and parks” standard to include such
properties.339 Instead, it noted that the sidewalk in question, outside of a public
school, was likely to be a crucial place for public speech because “public schools
in a community are important institutions, and are often the focus of significant
grievances.”340 In Conrad, which granted the highest level of constitutional
protection to private speech within a public theater, the Court did not base its
decision on whether theaters “time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly”;341 it instead held that the key similarity between theaters and “streets
and parks” was that they were “designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities.”342 Here, the time at which the forum was created was ultimately less

332
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1749–50 (1987).
333
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see Post, supra note 332, at 1750.
334
See, e.g., Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
335
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (noting that municipal theaters fall under the second category).
336
See United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion).
337
See, e.g., Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
338
In fact, public theaters already were afforded such protection in Conrad. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1975).
339
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
340
Id. at 118.
341
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see Conrad, 420 U.S. 546.
342
Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
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important than a different set of questions: (1) when the forum was created, was
it designed for expressive activities, and (2) had it been dedicated to such
activities ever since?343
Perry drew unprecedented lines across the public forum doctrine that
explicitly separated properties that the Court had previously grouped together.
In Conrad, the Court held that restricting speech in the theater was
“indistinguishable” from cases in which the government restricted speech in
public streets.344 Surprisingly, Perry explicitly excluded public theaters from its
definition of traditional public forums, electing to include them within the
second category of public forums alongside venues like meeting rooms in
universities and schools.345 This was an odd marriage, as the defining feature of
the theater that the Court focused on in Conrad—that it was “designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities”—was much more similar to streets, parks, or
sidewalks than school meeting rooms, which gained their significance purely
from government designation, not from any intrinsic quality as a place for
discussion.346 The Court in Perry chose instead to draw its dividing lines based
on the “immemorial” language in Hague,347 creating an overly narrow standard
for the traditional public forum that did not accurately reflect the progression in
the doctrine over the forty-four years between Hague and Perry.
2. A Misreading of Perry: “By Government Fiat”
Of course, Perry electing to break with precedent is not cause in itself to
revert to the precedent. However, the flexibility of public forum jurisprudence
from 1939 to 1982 was actually baked into Perry itself—it is Perry’s progeny
that seems to have left it behind. Perry held that traditional public forums are
places which “by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate.”348 Thus, the Perry Court’s version of the traditional
public forum is not, by its language, limited to Hague’s “immemorial”
standard.349 Multiple Supreme Court cases have directly quoted this Perry
language in determining what constitutes a public forum, but none seemed to
factor the second prong into their analysis.350 This did not escape the notice of
343

Id.
Id. at 552–53.
345
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
346
Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
347
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
348
Id. (emphasis added).
349
See id.
350
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
344
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Justice Blackmun, who in his Cornelius dissent noted that, per Perry, a
traditional public forum could be created by government fiat even if the forum
did not have a “long tradition . . . [of] assembly and debate.”351
The intended weight of the additional language in Perry is unclear, but, in
conjunction with the expansive history of the pre-Perry public forum doctrine,
it suggests that the “immemorial” standard is not the be-all and end-all of the
traditional public forum that many courts have claimed it to be. A government
forum that was created for the purposes of assembly, debate, and expressive
activities and has been used in such a way since its inception—in other words,
one that satisfies Conrad’s “designed for and dedicated to” standard—could fit
the definition of a traditional public forum equally well.352
Government-run social media accounts certainly clear this standard, as they
are created for the purposes of assembly, debate, and expressive activities. Social
media platforms have acknowledged this: Twitter’s mission statement is to “give
everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly without
barriers,” vowing to contribute to “a free and global conversation.”353
Government officials running the social media accounts have acknowledged
this.354 Courts have acknowledged this, even those that opted not to classify
government-run social media accounts as traditional public forums: in Trump I,
the Southern District of New York reasoned that Twitter was explicitly designed
for interaction, particularly for private users to “petition their elected
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”355 That
government-run social media accounts do not satisfy the Hague “immemorial”
requirement should not serve as an absolute bar to their classification as
traditional public forums, as they clearly satisfy the “designed and dedicated to”
standard suggested by the Court in Conrad and Perry. It is not only logical to
extend the highest level of First Amendment protection to the “most important
place[] . . . for the exchange of views” in today’s society,356 it is also legally
sound.

351

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id.
353
Investor Relations FAQ, TWITTER, https://investor.twitterinc.com/contact/faq/default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 14, 2021).
354
See Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting the White House Social Media
Director as saying that Trump’s Twitter account is a means by which he communicates “directly with . . . the
American people”); Davison II, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“Defendant designates her ‘Chair
Phyllis J. Randall’ Facebook page as a channel through which her constituents are directed to contact her[.]”).
355
Trump I, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
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Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
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IV. POST-TRUMP QUESTIONS, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS
As the Trump litigation caught the collective eye of the nation, various
criticisms of the idea of social media as a public forum surfaced.357 In response
to the Second Circuit’s holding in Trump II, multiple legal scholars and
commentators wrote that the Second Circuit erred by labeling Trump’s Twitter
account a public forum because it was ultimately owned by Twitter, rather than
the government.358 The essence of this argument is that a public forum must be
controlled entirely by the government, or else it cannot be public.359 The idea of
a privately owned and controlled public forum, however, has already been
addressed by the Supreme Court.360 In Conrad, the Court held that a privately
owned theater that was leased to the government still amounted to a public
forum, even though the private company had control, through its lease
agreement, over what speech would be permitted in the theater.361 The
government did not hold title to the theater in fee simple; it was merely a longterm tenant.362 Nonetheless, its dominion over the forum, even if temporary, was
sufficient to make it a publicly owned space for public forum purposes.363 That
private property could be a public forum even in the absence of total government
control was also suggested by the Court in Cornelius, which held that “a speaker
must seek access to public property or to private property devoted to public use
to evoke First Amendment concerns.”364 Legal ownership and full control of a
forum by the government has never been an insurmountable hurdle to public
forum status,365 and it should not be an insurmountable hurdle for governmentrun social media accounts.
Another logical concern about the implications of Trump II is that classifying
government-run social media as any sort of public forum—let alone a traditional
public forum—might allow too much speech, leaving the government helpless

357
E.g., Noah Feldman, The Courts Still Don’t Understand Trump’s Twitter Feed, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 9,
2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-09/appeals-court-asks-wrong-questionin-trump-twitter-blocking-case; John Samples, Do You Have a Constitutional Right to Follow the President on
Twitter?, CATO INST. (June 13, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/do-you-have-constitutional-rightfollow-president-twitter.
358
Feldman, supra note 357; Samples, supra note 357.
359
Feldman, supra note 357 (stating that “[p]roperty can’t be ‘government-controlled’ if someone else
can decide what speech happens there”).
360
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
361
Id. at 547–48, 552.
362
Id. at 547.
363
Id. at 555.
364
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (emphasis added).
365
See Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
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to censor potentially dangerous speech on their page.366 To be sure, if
government-run social media accounts were classified as traditional public
forums, government officials would be much more restricted in their ability to
block and remove private speech from their pages. This restriction, however,
would be far from absolute.367 The traditional public forum does not allow for
blanket protection of private speech; restrictions that are “necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end” are
permitted.368 This leaves untouched the government’s ability to censor, for
instance, threatening or harmful speech, while removing its ability to censor
speech at will.369
While concerns about social media as a public forum are relatively recent,
concerns about the public forum doctrine as a whole have persisted for decades.
The Perry framework has been severely criticized ever since its creation370 and
is ripe for reorganization. Much of this ire has been directed at the muddiness of
the second Perry category, which even today remains subject to varying judicial
interpretations.371 In his dissenting opinion in Cornelius in 1985, Justice
Blackmun noted that the permitted restrictions on speech in a limited public
forum were generally determined by the government’s intent in deciding to
which parties or subjects the forum should be “open.”372 If the government
determines the boundaries of a limited public forum and its “ability to define the
boundaries . . . is unconstrained,” he argued, then “the limited-public-forum
concept is meaningless.”373 Justice Kennedy raised similar issues in his
concurring opinion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee in
1992,374 arguing that a system predicated on governmental intent “leaves the
government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by
doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the
area.”375

366
See Alex Abdo, @realDonaldTrump and the First Amendment, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
COLUMBIA UNIV. (June 19, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/realdonaldtrump-and-first-amendment.
367
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
368
Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
369
See id.
370
See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 826 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
371
See id.; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693–94 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
372
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 826.
374
Lee, 505 U.S. at 693 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 695.
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Justice Kennedy criticized the idea of the traditional public forum as well in
Lee.376 Confining traditional public forums to the “immemorial” Hague venues,
he argued, creates an overly rigid doctrine with insufficient room for
expansion.377 As an alternative, he suggested a system that evaluates each public
property on its merits, with governmental intent not being nearly as important a
factor as the “objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the
actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government.”378
This line of discourse continues today. Lyrissa Lidsky, Dean of the
University of Missouri School of Law, noted in 2011 that “blurred lines between
limited public forums and nonpublic forums . . . create category confusion.”379
Courts still disagree on what exactly the second Perry category entails.380
Extending the traditional public forum to include government-run social media
accounts would not rattle well-established legal precedent; rather, it would add
clarity to a muddy doctrine that has been interpreted in different ways by
different courts.381 It would help to modernize an increasingly antiquated
framework that offers the strongest levels of First Amendment protection only
to the forums that were hotspots for private speech in 1939.382 Perhaps most
importantly, it would strengthen constitutional protection for speech in the most
critical modern-day forum for exercising First Amendment rights.383
CONCLUSION
In 1939, when the Supreme Court decided Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, public streets and parks were the most crucial government-owned
venues for speech and assembly. This is no longer the case. In the Supreme
Court’s own words, social media is the “most important place[] . . . for the
exchange of views” in today’s society.384 Government-run social media
accounts encompass four of the five “core qualities” of the traditional public
forum: (1) they are among society’s most important places for the exercise of
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382
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
383
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017).
384
Id. at 1735.
377

SMITH_3.8.21

2021]

3/9/2021 11:01 AM

THE NEW-AGE STREETS AND PARKS

1003

free speech; (2) they provide cost-free civilian access to government officials
through the First Amendment rights of assembly and petition; (3) they are, in the
absence of speech protections, at risk of arbitrary exercise of government power;
and (4) they can host speech without causing significant disruption. The only
hurdle between government-run social media accounts and classification as
traditional public forums—and, in turn, the highest level of First Amendment
protection for private speech—is the “immemorial” requirement imposed by
Hague.
The “immemorial” requirement, long considered by courts to be a
dispositive factor for classification as a traditional public forum, should be
loosened when evaluating government social media. This is a logical move for
practical reasons, as it would afford the highest level of First Amendment
protection to the forum that is most vital for the exercise of First Amendment
rights today. It is also logical for jurisprudential reasons, as the Supreme Court
in Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad offered a “traditional public forumlevel” of protection to speech in forums without an immemorial history, so long
as the “forums [were] designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.”385
Even Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, which is credited
with cementing the “immemorial” requirement, defined traditional public
forums as forums which “by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate.”386 Government-run social media accounts, by
virtue of government officials’ own words, comfortably clear these standards.
Thus, they should be afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection
by the courts: the traditional public forum.
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